Switzerland has reaffirmed its commitment to acquiring 36 Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II fighter jets, with the first deliveries scheduled for 2027. The decision marks a pivotal milestone in the country’s Air2030 program aimed at modernizing its air defense capabilities. However, the program continues to face domestic scrutiny over cost escalations and strategic alignment.
F-35A Procurement Timeline and Status
The Swiss Federal Department of Defence, Civil Protection and Sport (DDPS) confirmed that the first batch of F-35As will be delivered in 2027, with full operational capability expected by 2030. The CHF 6 billion ($6.5 billion) contract was signed in September 2022 following a narrow national referendum in September 2020 that approved the modernization effort by a margin of less than one percent.
Under the current schedule:
- Four aircraft will be delivered in 2027 for training purposes at Luke Air Force Base (Arizona), where Swiss pilots will undergo conversion training.
- Subsequent deliveries will continue through 2030 as infrastructure upgrades are completed at Swiss airbases such as Payerne and Meiringen.
- The aircraft will replace the aging fleet of F/A-18C/D Hornets and decommissioned F-5E/F Tigers.
The contract includes weapons packages (including AIM-120 AMRAAMs), mission planning systems, logistics support, training modules, and simulators. The procurement is managed through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) framework to ensure transparency and interoperability with NATO partners.
Strategic Rationale Behind Switzerland’s Selection
The selection of the F-35A followed a competitive evaluation process involving four contenders: Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet, Dassault’s Rafale, Airbus’ Eurofighter Typhoon, and Lockheed Martin’s F-35A. The Swiss evaluation emphasized effectiveness across mission types (air policing, ground attack), survivability against advanced threats (stealth), lifecycle costs, and interoperability with European partners.
According to Armasuisse (the Swiss procurement agency), the F-35 scored highest across all categories:
- Operational Effectiveness: Superior situational awareness via AN/APG-81 AESA radar and distributed aperture system (DAS).
- Survivability: Low observable design reduces detection by radar-guided SAMs common in near-peer environments.
- Cost Efficiency: Despite high upfront costs, long-term sustainment is projected to be lower than competitors due to global economies of scale (~3,500 units planned worldwide).
The choice also aligns Switzerland more closely with NATO air forces operating or planning to operate the F-35—including Germany, Finland, Norway, Italy, Belgium—and enhances joint training opportunities within Europe.
Domestic Political Resistance and Cost Concerns
The program remains politically contentious within Switzerland’s traditionally neutral defense posture. Opposition parties led by Group for a Switzerland without an Army (GSoA) have criticized both the platform selection process and rising costs tied to inflationary pressures on U.S.-based production lines.
A second referendum attempt was launched but ultimately failed due to procedural delays that would have postponed acquisition beyond Lockheed Martin’s price guarantee deadline of March 31st, 2023. This forced parliamentarians to proceed without awaiting further public input—a move criticized by civil society groups as undemocratic but defended by defense officials as necessary for maintaining contractual integrity.
Skeptics also point out that Switzerland lacks expeditionary ambitions—raising questions about whether a fifth-generation multirole stealth fighter is overkill for airspace policing duties over Alpine terrain. Proponents argue that even neutral nations must prepare for high-end threats in an increasingly unstable European security environment post-Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Industrial Participation and Offset Agreements
An important aspect of the deal involves industrial offsets totaling approximately CHF 2.9 billion (~49% of contract value). These include direct work packages on components such as fuselage parts or software modules for Lockheed Martin’s global supply chain—allocated among more than 100 Swiss firms across cantons including Zurich, Vaud, Bern and Ticino.
A key offset partner is RUAG Aerostructures Switzerland AG which has been tapped for component manufacturing support. Additionally:
- Pilatus Aircraft Ltd: Potential collaboration on maintenance or simulator systems integration.
- Kongsberg Defence Switzerland: May contribute via missile integration or data link systems aligned with NATO standards like Link-16/STANAG protocols.
- Diverse SMEs: Software development roles tied to mission planning tools or cyber-resilience testing environments under Armasuisse supervision.
This industrial participation aims not only at economic return but also at building sovereign sustainment capacity—critical given geopolitical uncertainties around future access to U.S.-based MRO channels or software updates under ITAR constraints.
NATO Interoperability Without Membership?
A unique dimension of this procurement is how it positions non-NATO member Switzerland within broader Western defense architectures. While officially neutral since 1815—and not part of NATO—Switzerland participates regularly in Partnership for Peace exercises and maintains secure data links with neighboring countries’ air forces during events like WEF Davos air policing operations.
The inclusion of Link-16 capability on Swiss F-35As allows real-time data sharing during joint operations or emergencies—effectively integrating them into regional C4ISR networks despite formal non-alignment status. This mirrors similar arrangements seen with Austria’s Eurofighters or Sweden’s Gripens prior to their respective shifts toward deeper NATO cooperation post-February 2022 geopolitical shifts in Europe.
Infrastructure Upgrades Underway
The introduction of stealth aircraft requires significant upgrades at home bases due to their specialized maintenance needs—including low observable coating repair facilities (“LO hangars”), hardened shelters compatible with classified avionics servicing protocols under U.S./JSF security rulesets (e.g., ALIS/ODIN systems), secure datalinks infrastructure installation (Link-16 terminals), electromagnetic shielding zones for sensitive electronics calibration etc.
Payerne Air Base has been designated as the primary operational hub; construction work began in late 2023 on hardened shelters adapted from STANAG standards used by other European JSF operators. Meiringen may serve as a secondary dispersal location depending on final basing doctrine decisions expected by mid–2026 from DDPS planners after consultation with USAF advisors embedded via bilateral working groups formed under JSF Partner Nation frameworks—even though Switzerland is not formally a JSF partner nation itself but an “FMS customer.”
Conclusion: Strategic Leap Fraught With Tradeoffs
The confirmation of delivery timelines locks Switzerland into one of Europe’s most advanced—but controversial—fighter modernization programs. While offering unmatched sensor fusion capabilities and long-term fleet viability through global sustainment pathways shared by dozens of allied users worldwide—the platform imposes steep financial burdens and political risks within a traditionally cautious national security culture built around neutrality rather than alliance-centric deterrence models.
If successfully integrated both technically and doctrinally into Swiss airspace control missions—with sufficient domestic industrial participation—the F-35 could redefine what neutrality looks like in an era where even non-aligned states must hedge against peer-level threats through technological parity rather than isolationism alone.
