Sweden’s Steadfast Noon Debut Reshapes NATO Nuclear Drill and Baltic Deterrence

Sweden’s inaugural participation in NATO’s annual nuclear deterrence exercise, Steadfast Noon 2025, marks a significant milestone in the Alliance’s evolving posture toward Russia and the Baltic region. The move reflects Stockholm’s deepening integration into NATO nuclear planning structures and signals a recalibration of strategic deterrence dynamics across Northern Europe.

Steadfast Noon 2025: Sweden Joins the Nuclear Club—Symbolically

Held annually since the Cold War era, Steadfast Noon is NATO’s premier non-live nuclear exercise designed to rehearse procedures for deploying U.S. tactical nuclear weapons stored in Europe under the Alliance’s nuclear sharing arrangements. While no live weapons are used during the drill, participating nations simulate strike missions using dual-capable aircraft (DCA), such as the F-16 or Tornado, capable of delivering B61-series gravity bombs.

In October 2025, Sweden joined Steadfast Noon for the first time since its accession to NATO earlier that year. Though not a nuclear weapons state nor part of NATO’s formal nuclear sharing program (currently limited to Belgium, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, and Turkey), Sweden contributed support assets and airspace access during the exercise hosted by Germany and involving over a dozen Allies.

This symbolic yet operationally relevant participation underscores Stockholm’s willingness to integrate into all facets of NATO defense planning—including those involving nuclear deterrence—despite domestic political sensitivities around nuclear weapons deployment on Swedish soil.

Strategic Geography: Sweden Reinforces Baltic Deterrence Architecture

Sweden’s geographic position dramatically enhances NATO’s strategic depth in Northern Europe. Its territory offers critical basing options and air corridors for operations over the Baltic Sea region—a key flashpoint given Russia’s militarized Kaliningrad exclave and its robust anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities.

• Baltic Airspace Integration: Swedish airspace now provides additional routing flexibility for DCA platforms during crisis scenarios.
• ISR Support: Sweden operates advanced airborne early warning assets like Saab GlobalEye AEW&C platforms that can augment Alliance situational awareness during high-tempo operations.
• SAM Coverage: The Swedish Armed Forces field modern GBAD systems such as IRIS-T SLS and Patriot PAC-3 MSE batteries (procured from Raytheon), providing layered defense against Russian cruise missiles or Iskander-M SRBMs.

While Sweden does not host U.S. B61 bombs under current arrangements—and has no declared intent to do so—its infrastructure could support forward-deployed assets in contingency scenarios. Moreover, its future fleet of F-35A Joint Strike Fighters will be technically compatible with B61-12 munitions by default design (though software locks would restrict use without political authorization).

Nuclear Signaling to Russia Amid Heightened Tensions

The inclusion of Sweden in Steadfast Noon sends an unmistakable signal to Moscow that NATO’s northern flank is now fully integrated into collective deterrence frameworks. This comes amid continued Russian deployments of dual-capable missile systems in Kaliningrad Oblast—including Iskander-M launchers reportedly capable of carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads—and increased Tu-22M3 bomber patrols over the Baltic Sea.

NATO officials have emphasized that Steadfast Noon remains a defensive exercise aimed at ensuring credible deterrence rather than escalating tensions. However, Russian state media quickly condemned Sweden’s participation as “provocative” and warned it could lead to “countermeasures” including enhanced missile deployments or electronic warfare activity targeting Nordic infrastructure.

The Swedish Ministry of Defence countered by highlighting that participation aligns with Article 5 responsibilities and enhances interoperability within Allied command structures—notably within STRIKFORNATO (Naval Striking and Support Forces NATO) and AIRCOM frameworks.

NATO Nuclear Posture Evolves with New Members

The integration of Finland (2023) and Sweden (2024) into NATO has prompted internal reassessments about how new members contribute to—and are protected by—the Alliance’s nuclear umbrella. While neither country is expected to host U.S. tactical nukes under current policy frameworks or public sentiment constraints, both bring advanced capabilities that enhance survivability and resilience across multiple domains:

• Finland: Extensive ground-based sensor networks along its long border with Russia feed into regional early warning architectures; also fields NASAMS batteries integrated with Link-16 C2 systems.
• Sweden: Naval assets including Gotland-class submarines offer stealth ISR potential; Gripen E fighters provide agile multi-role capacity even if not DCA-certified.
• Civil Defense Infrastructure: Both nations maintain robust civil defense protocols hardened against CBRN threats—a legacy from Cold War doctrine now being revitalized under NATO guidance.

The broader implication is that while formal nuclear sharing remains limited to legacy participants under bilateral U.S.-host nation agreements governed by dual-key control mechanisms, newer members can still play vital roles in supporting strategic deterrence through logistics support, sensor fusion, cyber resilience contributions—and increasingly through symbolic alignment such as Steadfast Noon involvement.

B61-12 Modernization Drives Interoperability Push

A key technical backdrop to these developments is the ongoing modernization of U.S. tactical nuclear forces in Europe via deployment of B61-12 gravity bombs—now equipped with tail kits for improved accuracy via inertial navigation systems (INS). These precision-guided variants are replacing older B61 models at bases like Büchel (Germany) and Aviano (Italy).

The B61-12 program enhances interoperability by standardizing a single variant compatible with multiple DCA platforms including F-16s, Tornado IDS aircraft—and notably F-35As operated by several European Allies including Italy, Belgium, Netherlands…and soon Poland and Czechia as well. This convergence simplifies training pipelines while expanding credible delivery options across multiple theaters.

If Sweden proceeds with its planned acquisition of up to two squadrons (~60 aircraft) of F-35A Lightning IIs starting late this decade—as indicated by recent RFI documents—it will possess a platform intrinsically capable of carrying B61-series weapons even if politically restricted from doing so absent future doctrinal shifts or Alliance-wide consensus changes post-crisis onset scenarios.