Russia to Deploy RS-28 Sarmat ICBM: Capabilities and Strategic Impact

Russia’s long-awaited RS-28 Sarmat intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), also known by NATO as SS-X-30 “Satan II,” is reportedly nearing operational deployment. President Vladimir Putin recently confirmed that the missile will soon enter combat duty with the Strategic Missile Forces (RVSN), marking a significant milestone in Russia’s nuclear modernization program. This article explores the technical characteristics of the Sarmat system, its strategic role within Russia’s deterrence posture, and the broader implications for global arms dynamics.

RS-28 Sarmat Overview and Development Timeline

The RS-28 Sarmat is a super-heavy liquid-fueled ICBM developed by Russia’s Makeyev Rocket Design Bureau as a replacement for the aging R-36M2 Voevoda (SS-18 “Satan”) system. The program began in earnest in 2009 with design work initiated under State Armament Program 2020. The missile was officially unveiled in 2016 after successful silo ejection tests at Plesetsk Cosmodrome.

After several delays due to technical and budgetary challenges—including issues with silo adaptation and command/control integration—the first full flight test occurred in April 2022. According to Russian Ministry of Defense statements and satellite imagery analysis from open-source intelligence platforms like Janes and CSIS Missile Threat Project, at least three flight tests have taken place since then.

President Putin announced on October 5th, 2025 that the missile will “soon” be placed on combat duty. While no specific date was provided, Russian defense officials previously indicated that deployment would begin before the end of 2025 at units within the Uzhur Missile Division (62nd Missile Division) in Krasnoyarsk Krai.

Technical Specifications and Capabilities

The RS-28 Sarmat represents a leap in payload capacity and survivability over its predecessor:

Launch Weight: ~208 metric tons
Length: ~35.5 meters
Diameter: ~3 meters
Range: Estimated >18,000 km
Payload Capacity: Up to 10–15 MIRVs or combination of MIRVs + decoys + hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs)

Sarmat is designed to carry multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) with yields ranging from several hundred kilotons to over one megaton per warhead. It can also be configured to carry Avangard-class hypersonic glide vehicles—a capability already fielded on a limited basis aboard UR-100N UTTKh missiles since late 2019.

The missile uses a cold-launch system from hardened silos—ejecting via gas pressure before ignition—to enhance survivability against preemptive strikes. Its trajectory flexibility allows it to approach targets via polar or southern hemispheric routes, potentially bypassing conventional radar coverage such as NORAD’s Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS).

MIRVs and Hypersonic Glide Vehicles Integration

A key feature of the RS-28 is its ability to deliver advanced warhead configurations tailored for strategic penetration. These include:

MIRV Package: Up to ten heavy or fifteen lighter MIRVs with individual guidance systems.
Penetration Aids: Decoys (penaids), chaff dispensers, electronic countermeasures.
Hypersonic Glide Vehicles: Reportedly up to three Avangard-class HGVs per missile under certain configurations.

The Avangard HGV travels at speeds exceeding Mach 20 during terminal phase while maneuvering unpredictably at low altitudes—posing serious challenges for current midcourse interceptors like GMD or THAAD. If integrated successfully onto Sarmat platforms in larger numbers than legacy UR-100N carriers allow, this could significantly enhance Russia’s second-strike credibility against evolving missile defense architectures.

Silo Deployment Plans and Strategic Force Integration

The first regiment scheduled to receive operational Sarmats belongs to the Uzhur-based division under Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN). Satellite imagery from Planet Labs has shown extensive refurbishment activity at silo sites near Uzhur since mid-2023—consistent with preparations for new launch systems requiring deeper silo shafts due to increased missile length.

The RVSN plans call for eventual deployment across three divisions:

Kozelsk Missile Division (Kaluga Oblast)
Dombarovskiy Missile Division (Orenburg Oblast)
Uzhur Missile Division (Krasnoyarsk Krai)

Sarmat will likely serve alongside existing Topol-M/RS-12M2 systems before gradually replacing all remaining R-36M Voevoda missiles by early next decade. Open-source estimates suggest up to fifty silos may eventually host RS-28s if full production proceeds as planned under State Armament Program through 2030.

Nuclear Doctrine Context and Global Implications

The deployment of RS-28 aligns closely with revisions made in Russia’s nuclear doctrine over recent years emphasizing escalation control through credible retaliation capabilities—even under conventional threat scenarios (“escalate-to-deescalate”). The introduction of new delivery systems like Kinzhal ALBM, Poseidon UUVs, Burevestnik cruise missiles—and now Sarmat—reflects an effort to diversify nuclear vectors beyond legacy triad structures.

This development also comes amid rising tensions between NATO states and Russia following continued hostilities in Ukraine and increased NATO military presence near Russian borders. Western analysts view the timing of this announcement as both strategic signaling ahead of potential arms control negotiations post-New START expiry in February 2026—and internal messaging aimed at reinforcing deterrence credibility among domestic audiences.

Status of Arms Control Treaties and Future Outlook

Sarmat’s entry into service raises questions about future arms control frameworks given New START’s impending expiration without clear successor mechanisms yet agreed upon between Washington and Moscow. The treaty currently limits deployed strategic warheads at 1,550 per side—but does not constrain novel delivery systems like Avangard-equipped ICBMs or Poseidon underwater drones.

If bilateral dialogue remains stalled—as it has been since early 2023—Russia may feel emboldened to accelerate production beyond previously declared ceilings while pursuing asymmetric capabilities designed specifically to undermine Western missile defense investments.

Conclusion: A New Era for Russian Strategic Deterrence?

The imminent deployment of the RS-28 Sarmat marks a significant evolution in Russian nuclear force posture—both technologically and doctrinally. With unmatched throw-weight capacity combined with maneuverable warheads capable of evading current defenses, it represents not just a replacement but an escalation in capability relative to Cold War-era predecessors.

If fielded at scale alongside other emerging systems like Avangard HGVs or Burevestnik cruise missiles, it could dramatically alter strategic calculus between nuclear powers—especially absent renewed arms control agreements limiting their scope or quantity. Whether this prompts reciprocal modernization among adversaries or renewed diplomatic engagement remains uncertain—but what is clear is that global deterrence dynamics are entering a more complex phase driven by technological innovation rather than numerical parity alone.