Pentagon Urges Missile Industry Surge to Prepare for Potential China Conflict

In a clear signal of shifting defense priorities toward great power competition, the U.S. Department of Defense is pressing major missile manufacturers to significantly ramp up production capacity. The move reflects growing concerns over the U.S. military’s ability to sustain a high-intensity conflict with China in the Indo-Pacific theater.

Pentagon Sounds Alarm on Missile Stockpile Shortfalls

Senior Pentagon officials have reportedly met with top executives from Lockheed Martin, Raytheon Technologies (RTX), Northrop Grumman and other key defense contractors to emphasize the urgent need for expanded production of long-range precision munitions. The focus is on critical systems such as:

• JASSM-ER (Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missile – Extended Range): A stealthy cruise missile designed for penetrating advanced air defenses.
• LRASM (Long Range Anti-Ship Missile): A naval strike weapon optimized for contested maritime environments.
• SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles: Multi-role naval missiles used for anti-air and land attack roles.

The concern stems from classified wargames and operational planning that suggest current inventories would be rapidly depleted in the event of a sustained conflict with China over Taiwan or in the South China Sea. According to recent statements by U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) leaders and congressional testimony by defense officials, even a limited-duration high-intensity fight could exhaust current stockpiles within days or weeks.

Industrial Bottlenecks and Supply Chain Fragility

The Pentagon’s push comes amid persistent challenges in the U.S. defense industrial base. While companies like Lockheed Martin produce JASSM-ER at roughly 500 units per year and aim to increase that number to over 1,000 by 2026 under multiyear contracts signed in FY2023–24, key bottlenecks remain:

• Sole-source suppliers for rocket motors and microelectronics limit surge capacity.
• Workforce shortages, particularly skilled technicians in propulsion and guidance system assembly.
• Legacy production lines not optimized for rapid scaling due to lean peacetime procurement strategies post-Cold War.

The COVID-era supply chain disruptions further exposed vulnerabilities in rare earth materials sourcing and sub-tier supplier fragility—issues that persist despite recent attempts at reshoring critical components through Defense Production Act (DPA) authorities.

Defense Production Act May Be Leveraged Again

The Biden administration has already invoked DPA Title III authority multiple times since 2021 to accelerate domestic production of hypersonics components, solid rocket motors (e.g., Aerojet Rocketdyne), microelectronics packaging facilities, and energetics materials like HMX/RDX explosives used in warheads. In light of mounting tensions with Beijing—particularly following Chinese military exercises near Taiwan—senior DoD officials are reportedly considering additional DPA actions or multiyear block buys as incentives for industry investment.

A March 2024 report from the Congressional Research Service noted that while DPA tools are effective at jumpstarting niche capabilities or solving acute shortages, they are not a substitute for sustained procurement demand signals backed by predictable funding. As such, Congress has been urged by both DoD leadership and think tanks like CSIS to authorize multi-year procurement contracts across munitions programs—a model already used successfully for SM-6s and Tomahawks under Navy contracts awarded to Raytheon Missiles & Defense.

Taiwan Scenario Drives Strategic Calculations

The urgency behind these moves stems largely from evolving threat assessments regarding China’s military posture around Taiwan. The PLA Rocket Force has deployed hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles within range of Taiwan’s key airbases and ports. In response, U.S. planners envision a scenario where American forces must rapidly deploy long-range strike assets—including B-21 bombers armed with JASSM-XR or LRASM—to hold Chinese naval forces at risk while avoiding heavily defended airspace.

This contingency requires not just exquisite platforms but deep magazines of standoff munitions capable of surviving GPS jamming or integrated air defenses like HQ-9B or HQ-22 systems fielded by the PLA Air Force. A RAND Corporation study published in late 2023 concluded that “munitions depth”—the ability to sustain fires beyond initial salvos—is now as critical as platform survivability when facing peer adversaries like China.

Ammunition Surge Echoes Lessons from Ukraine Conflict

The Pentagon’s call echoes lessons learned from Ukraine’s defense against Russia’s invasion since February 2022. Western nations were caught off guard by how quickly artillery shells (155 mm), guided rockets (e.g., GMLRS), anti-tank weapons (Javelin), and MANPADS were consumed on modern battlefields—often far exceeding Cold War-era planning assumptions based on low-intensity conflicts like Afghanistan or Iraq.

This experience has prompted NATO allies—including Germany, Poland, Sweden—to also invest heavily in expanding domestic ammunition plants via public-private partnerships. In parallel, U.S.-based firms have received billions under supplemental Ukraine aid packages earmarked specifically for replenishing stockpiles depleted by transfers abroad—further straining baseline inventories needed for Pacific contingencies.

Outlook: From Peacetime Efficiency to Wartime Readiness?

The broader implication is that after decades of prioritizing cost-efficiency through just-in-time logistics and minimal inventories (“lean” manufacturing models), the Pentagon is now pivoting toward resilience through redundancy—accepting higher unit costs if it ensures wartime availability at scale.

This shift is evident not only in missile production but also across domains—from expanding artillery shell output at Scranton Army Ammunition Plant (155 mm) to restarting dormant tank factories (e.g., Lima Army Tank Plant) under new modernization contracts tied to European deterrence efforts.

Conclusion: Strategic Deterrence Through Industrial Strength

If deterrence against China hinges on credible combat power projection across vast distances—and sustaining it beyond initial strikes—the readiness of America’s missile industrial base becomes an essential pillar alongside forward-deployed forces or alliance networks like AUKUS or QUAD. Whether industry can meet this challenge before crisis strikes remains an open question—but one now receiving unprecedented attention inside the Pentagon’s E-Ring corridors.