NATO has initiated a collaborative effort to develop a next-generation maritime missile system intended to replace or surpass the capabilities of the RIM-162 Evolved SeaSparrow Missile (ESSM) Block 2. The new program seeks to address emerging aerial threats such as hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs), maneuvering anti-ship missiles, and drone swarms that challenge current naval air defense systems.
Strategic Context Behind NATO’s New Maritime Missile Initiative
The decision to pursue a new missile system stems from evolving threat dynamics in contested maritime environments. The proliferation of low-observable cruise missiles (e.g., Russia’s Kalibr-M), high-speed sea-skimming threats (e.g., China’s YJ-18), and increasingly autonomous UAVs has exposed limitations in legacy shipborne interceptors like the ESSM Block 2. While the ESSM remains a capable medium-range solution for point and limited area defense, its semi-active radar homing architecture and engagement envelope may be insufficient against saturation attacks or advanced maneuvering targets.
In response, NATO’s Defence Planning Process (NDPP) has reportedly endorsed a multinational development track for what is being informally referred to as the “Next Generation Maritime Short-range” (NGMS) missile. While still in early concept phases as of late 2025, this effort is expected to integrate lessons learned from recent conflicts—particularly in Ukraine and the Red Sea—where layered air defenses have faced challenges from loitering munitions and multi-vector attacks.
Targeted Capabilities: Beyond ESSM Block 2
The envisioned NGMS missile is expected to exceed ESSM Block 2 capabilities across several domains:
- Guidance: Shift from semi-active radar homing (SARH) to active radar homing or dual-mode seekers (RF + IR or EO/IR) for enhanced terminal accuracy and fire-and-forget capability.
- Kinematic Performance: Improved agility and acceleration for better interception of supersonic or highly maneuverable targets.
- C-UAS Optimization: Enhanced ability to engage small UAVs and loitering munitions with high probability of kill (Pk).
- Networked Engagement: Compatibility with cooperative engagement capabilities (CEC), Link-16/22 datalinks, and multi-domain sensor fusion.
This places NGMS conceptually closer to systems like MBDA’s CAMM-ER or even aspects of Aster 15/30 than traditional SHORAD-class missiles. However, it remains distinct from long-range interceptors like SM-6 or Aster B1NT in both cost and role.
Industry Players and Program Structure
The program is expected to involve key European defense primes under NATO coordination. According to multiple defense sources consulted by MiliVox:
- MBDA is likely a leading candidate given its experience with CAMM/CAMM-ER family used by multiple NATO navies including the UK Royal Navy’s Sea Ceptor system aboard Type 23 frigates.
- Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace, already collaborating on NSM/JSM programs with NATO allies, may contribute seeker technology or integration expertise.
- Thales Nederland, with its SMART-S Mk2 radar pedigree used on many NATO frigates, could support sensor-missile integration efforts.
No prime contractor has been formally announced as of Q3 2025. However, early-stage feasibility studies are reportedly funded through NATO’s Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) framework alongside national contributions from at least four member states—believed to include Italy, France, Norway, and Germany.
Evolving Threats Driving Requirement Shifts
The war in Ukraine has underscored how even modestly priced loitering munitions can saturate layered defenses when used en masse. Similarly, Houthi attacks on commercial shipping in the Red Sea using Iranian-designed drones have highlighted vulnerabilities in naval close-in weapon systems (CIWS) when faced with persistent low-RCS threats operating below radar horizons.
NATO planners are thus emphasizing faster reaction times (<3 seconds from detection-to-launch), improved off-boresight targeting via AESA radars or EO/IR cuing systems like Leonardo’s Medusa DIRCM suite, and modular vertical launch compatibility—likely within existing Mk41 VLS cells but potentially also adaptable for quad-pack configurations akin to CAMM’s ExLS integration model.
Timeline and Development Milestones
The NGMS program is currently in pre-conceptual design phase with initial technology demonstrators expected by late 2027 if funding commitments hold through FY2026. Key projected milestones include:
- 2026: Finalization of joint requirements document under NATO CNAD umbrella; selection of lead integrator(s).
- 2027–28: Technology demonstrator flight tests; subsystem validation including seeker trials against drone swarms/supersonic surrogates.
- 2030–31: Initial operational capability on select NATO frigates; likely candidates include FREMM variants or Type F126 platforms under construction for Germany/Norway.
If successful, NGMS could eventually replace not only ESSM but also serve as a common short-to-medium range naval interceptor across multiple classes—from corvettes up through destroyers—simplifying logistics while enhancing interoperability across allied fleets.
Sourcing Challenges and Interoperability Goals
A key challenge will be balancing industrial participation among major European stakeholders while ensuring U.S.-NATO interoperability standards are met—particularly regarding data links (Link-16/22), IFF protocols (STANAG-compliant), and VLS compatibility. The U.S. Navy’s continued reliance on Raytheon’s SM family means full replacement of ESSM within U.S. fleets is unlikely; however allied navies may opt for NGMS if it offers superior performance at competitive cost-per-shot ratios compared with interceptors like SM-6 (~$4 million per unit).
NATO sources indicate that while NGMS will not be mandated alliance-wide upon completion, it will be offered as an interoperable option under Smart Defence initiatives aiming at capability pooling across smaller navies lacking domestic missile R&D capacity.
Conclusion: A Strategic Leap Toward Resilient Naval Air Defense
NATO’s decision to pursue a next-generation maritime interceptor reflects both technological necessity and strategic foresight amid rapidly evolving aerial threats. By moving beyond legacy SARH architectures toward networked fire-and-forget solutions optimized for drone-era warfare at sea—and potentially leveraging European industrial strengths—the alliance aims not only at replacing legacy systems but redefining naval SHORAD doctrine altogether.
