In a strategic demonstration of regional defense integration, Sweden and Poland executed the bilateral Gotland Sentry 2025 exercise in early September. The drill focused on safeguarding key NATO transit corridors across the Baltic Sea amid rising tensions with Russia. It involved coordinated air defense operations, naval surveillance missions, and ISR integration centered around the Swedish island of Gotland—a critical maritime chokepoint.
Strategic Context: Why Gotland Matters
Gotland Island occupies a central position in the Baltic Sea and is considered a linchpin in controlling regional airspace and sea lanes. For NATO planners, it forms one half of a strategic corridor—the other being the Polish-Lithuanian Suwałki Gap—that connects Western Europe with the Baltic States. In a conflict scenario involving Russia’s Kaliningrad exclave or Belarusian territory, this corridor could become a contested zone for reinforcement and resupply operations.
Russia’s increasing A2/AD (anti-access/area denial) posture from Kaliningrad—featuring S-400 SAMs, Bastion-P coastal defense systems (SSC-5), Iskander-M SRBMs (SS-26), and electronic warfare units—has elevated concerns about securing this corridor. Sweden’s full NATO accession in 2024 has now enabled tighter operational coordination with Poland to counter these threats.
Exercise Overview: Air Defense and Maritime Surveillance Integration
Gotland Sentry 2025 was designed as an integrated air-maritime exercise emphasizing real-time data sharing between Swedish and Polish forces. According to official releases from both nations’ Ministries of Defence (Försvarsmakten and MON), key components included:
- Airspace control drills: Swedish JAS-39C/D Gripen fighters conducted CAP (Combat Air Patrol) missions alongside Polish F-16C/D Block 52+ aircraft over southern Gotland.
- Naval ISR operations: Swedish Visby-class corvettes collaborated with Polish ORP Kaszub-class vessels for radar tracking of simulated threats approaching from east of Bornholm Island.
- C4ISR integration: Both nations tested interoperability between Link-16 tactical data links and national C2 systems under simulated jamming conditions.
- Ground-based air defense drills: Sweden deployed its RBS-98 IRIS-T SL SAM batteries while Poland operated elements of its upgraded Poprad SHORAD systems near Ustka.
- Airlift logistics: Polish C-130 Hercules aircraft practiced rapid deployment scenarios to Visby Airport under contested conditions.
The exercise also involved cyber-resilience testing of battlefield communications nodes using simulated GNSS spoofing attacks—an area where Russian EW capabilities have proven potent in Ukraine.
NATO Interoperability Gains Post-Swedish Accession
This was one of the first major bilateral exercises following Sweden’s formal entry into NATO in March 2024. While Sweden had long cooperated with the alliance under Partnership for Peace frameworks, full membership has unlocked new levels of operational planning access—including participation in NATO Integrated Air & Missile Defence (IAMD) architecture.
The Gotland Sentry drill served as a testbed for integrating Swedish Gripens into NATO’s Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) battle rhythm. It also validated cross-national coordination between Polish radar installations (notably those near Gdynia) and Swedish coastal surveillance radars on Gotland feeding into shared Recognized Air Picture (RAP) generation via Link-16/MIDS terminals.
A Response to Russian Maritime Posturing
The timing of Gotland Sentry coincided with increased Russian naval activity in the eastern Baltic. Open-source satellite imagery reviewed by MiliVox indicates that at least two Steregushchiy-class corvettes from Russia’s Baltic Fleet conducted ASW drills near Kaliningrad during the same week. Additionally, Russian Tu-22M3 bombers were tracked flying over neutral waters north of Estonia—likely probing allied radar coverage zones.
This backdrop underscores why both Stockholm and Warsaw are accelerating joint readiness initiatives. In recent months:
- Sweden reactivated Cold War-era bunkers on Gotland for SAM command posts;
- Poland deployed mobile radar units near Elbląg capable of tracking low-flying cruise missiles;
- NATO AWACS flights have increased over Lithuania by ~40% since early summer;
- Bilateral agreements have expanded port access rights for each other’s naval vessels at Karlskrona and Gdynia respectively.
The message is clear: securing freedom of movement across the Suwałki-Gotland axis is now a top-tier priority for regional planners facing hybrid threats from Russia’s Western Military District assets.
The Road Ahead: Toward Joint A2/AD Capabilities?
The success of Gotland Sentry has prompted discussions within both governments about deeper integration—not just interoperability but joint capability development. Analysts suggest future steps may include:
- Bilateral A2/AD zones: Coordinated deployment zones for overlapping SAM coverage using IRIS-T SLX or CAMM-MR systems;
- Shared maritime drone patrols: Use of AI-enabled USVs/UUVs for persistent ISR along key sea lanes;
- Civil-military dual use infrastructure upgrades: Hardened runways at Visby Airport; improved ferry terminals at Świnoujście;
- SIGINT fusion cells: Integrating SIGINT feeds from Polish Lotos platforms with Swedish FRA assets for real-time threat cueing;
NATO officials have not confirmed whether future iterations will become part of Steadfast Defender or BALTOPS frameworks but note that “regionalized deterrence” is now central to alliance planning post-Finland/Sweden enlargement.
