China Launches Yaogan-45 Satellite on Long March 7A in Strategic ISR Expansion

On June 22, 2024, China successfully launched the Yaogan-45 satellite aboard a Long March 7A rocket from the Wenchang Space Launch Site. While officially described as a “remote sensing satellite,” the classified nature and historical patterns of the Yaogan series strongly suggest military reconnaissance functions. This launch underscores Beijing’s sustained push to expand its space-based intelligence and surveillance infrastructure in support of strategic C4ISR objectives.

Launch Overview and Platform Details

The Yaogan-45 satellite lifted off at approximately 15:00 local time (07:00 UTC) from Wenchang’s LC-201 pad using a three-stage Long March 7A (CZ-7A) launch vehicle. The China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) confirmed mission success shortly after orbital insertion. The payload was reportedly placed into a geosynchronous transfer orbit (GTO), suggesting that it may maneuver into geostationary orbit (GEO) or remain in high elliptical orbit depending on mission requirements.

The CZ-7A is an upgraded variant of the standard Long March 7 designed for high-energy missions to GTO and beyond. It features a core stage with four strap-on liquid-fueled boosters and an upper stage powered by YF-75 engines using cryogenic propellants. This was the sixth successful flight of the CZ-7A since its debut in March 2020.

Yaogan Series: A Cloaked Military Constellation

Although Chinese state media routinely describe Yaogan satellites as serving civilian remote sensing roles—such as land resource surveys or disaster monitoring—their orbital characteristics and sensor payloads consistently align with military applications. Western analysts widely assess that various Yaogan subseries fulfill distinct roles:

Yaogan-H: Optical reconnaissance satellites with high-resolution electro-optical imaging systems.
Yaogan-R: Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) platforms capable of all-weather day/night imaging.
Yaogan-S: Signals intelligence (SIGINT) trios operating in coordinated formations to geolocate radio emissions.
Yaogan-G: Possibly equipped with infrared sensors or other specialized payloads for missile warning or tracking.

The exact configuration of Yaogan-45 remains undisclosed; however, based on launch vehicle capacity and orbital profile, it is likely either an EO/IR optical imaging platform or an advanced SIGINT payload intended for persistent surveillance over strategic regions such as Taiwan, South China Sea corridors, or U.S. Indo-Pacific assets.

Orbital Behavior Suggests Strategic Monitoring Role

Post-launch tracking by amateur satellite observers indicates that Yaogan-45 was inserted into an initial GTO with perigee near ~200 km and apogee exceeding ~35,000 km. If circularized into GEO or inclined GEO orbit (~35° inclination), this would enable continuous coverage over specific regions—ideal for persistent electronic surveillance or missile early warning functions.

This profile contrasts with many previous Yaogans placed into sun-synchronous low Earth orbit (LEO), which are optimized for global revisit rates but lack persistent dwell time over any single area. The shift toward higher-altitude deployments reflects China’s intent to diversify its ISR architecture across multiple orbital regimes—LEO for tactical coverage; GEO/MEO for strategic overwatch and early warning.

C4ISR Integration with PLA Rocket Force and Navy

The deployment of space-based ISR assets like Yaogan is tightly integrated with China’s broader C4ISR modernization under the People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force (PLASSF). These satellites feed real-time data into command networks supporting:

Anti-access/area denial (A2/AD): Targeting U.S. carrier strike groups using long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles like DF-21D/DF-26B.
Ballistic missile cueing: Providing mid-course updates to theater-range missiles aimed at Guam or other forward-deployed U.S. bases.
Tactical naval support: Enhancing maritime domain awareness across disputed waters via fusion with UAVs and surface radars.
SIGINT mapping: Locating adversary radar emitters or communication nodes for electronic warfare targeting.

This multi-domain integration aligns with recent PLA doctrine emphasizing “system-of-systems” operations where space-based sensors serve as key enablers across land-sea-air-cyber domains.

A Growing Space Order of Battle

The launch of Yaogan-45 adds to what is already one of the world’s most extensive military space constellations outside NATO frameworks. According to open-source assessments by Secure World Foundation and CSIS’ Aerospace Security Project:

– China operates over two dozen active reconnaissance satellites under the Yaogan label.
– At least six SAR-capable spacecraft are believed operational.
– Several SIGINT triplets continue coordinated operations across LEO planes.
– Multiple GEO assets—possibly including missile warning demonstrators—have been launched since ~2016.

Combined with commercial dual-use constellations like Jilin EO satellites operated by Chang Guang Satellite Technology Co., Beijing now fields layered orbital coverage rivaling early U.S./Russian Cold War-era capabilities.

Notably, China has also begun deploying smallsat constellations focused on rapid revisit rates—a trend paralleling Western efforts like Capella Space or BlackSky—with potential military utility despite nominally civilian operators.

Implications for Regional Security Dynamics

The continued expansion of China’s space-based ISR network has direct implications for Indo-Pacific security balances:

Taiwan contingency planning: Persistent overhead surveillance improves PLA ability to monitor ROC force movements during crisis buildup phases without overt escalation signals like aircraft incursions.
Crisis stability risks: Enhanced situational awareness could embolden preemptive action if Beijing perceives windows of opportunity based on real-time ISR feeds—a concern echoed by U.S. INDOPACOM planners.
Counterspace tensions: As China’s reliance on military satellites deepens, so too does its vulnerability to kinetic ASAT strikes or cyber interference—potentially fueling arms race dynamics in space domain operations (SDO).
Dissuasion through transparency: Western governments may respond by increasing public release of unclassified satellite imagery showing PRC activities—leveraging commercial EO firms as counterintelligence tools against opaque Chinese deployments.

Conclusion: Strategic Signposts in Orbit

The launch of Yaogan-45 represents more than just another payload—it signals China’s continued investment in high-end space-based ISR capabilities tailored for modern joint operations under contested conditions. As Beijing matures its orbital infrastructure across LEO/GEO/SAR/SIGINT axes, regional actors must adapt their own C4ISR resilience strategies accordingly—including hardening networks against ELINT penetration and diversifying sensor architectures beyond line-of-sight dependencies.

This evolving contest underscores that future conflicts will be shaped not only by terrestrial firepower but also by who controls—and protects—the high ground above Earth’s atmosphere.