China Tests ‘Golden Dome’ Radar Variant to Track 1,000 U.S. Missiles Simultaneously

China has reportedly tested a new large-scale strategic radar system with capabilities reminiscent of Israel’s “Golden Dome” concept—designed to track and classify up to 1,000 incoming missiles simultaneously. This development highlights Beijing’s accelerating efforts to modernize its missile defense architecture amid intensifying rivalry with the United States and its allies.

Strategic Radar Test Signals Shift in Chinese Missile Defense Posture

According to Chinese state-affiliated media reports and corroborated by open-source imagery analysis from satellite intelligence platforms such as Planet Labs and Sentinel Hub (October 2025), China recently conducted a full-scale test of a massive phased-array radar installation in the western desert regions—likely within the PLA Strategic Support Force’s (PLASSF) jurisdiction. The system is reportedly designed for long-range ballistic missile detection and tracking across multiple trajectories.

The test was described by Chinese sources as simulating a scenario involving the detection of up to 1,000 missiles launched from various directions—an implicit reference to potential saturation attacks by U.S. or allied forces in the Indo-Pacific theater. The radar array is believed to be part of an integrated early warning network that includes space-based sensors (e.g., Gaofen satellites), over-the-horizon (OTH) radars along China’s eastern seaboard, and airborne platforms such as KJ-500 AEW&C aircraft.

Design Inspiration: Echoes of Israel’s “Golden Dome” Concept

The term “Golden Dome” is not officially used by China but appears in Western reporting as an analogy referencing Israel’s multi-layered air defense architecture—particularly its high-resolution EL/M-2080 Green Pine radar used in conjunction with Arrow interceptors. While China does not operate identical systems, military analysts suggest that Beijing is pursuing a similar layered approach combining:

Strategic early warning radars (e.g., X-band or VHF-band phased arrays)
Midcourse discrimination via space-based infrared sensors
Terminal-phase interceptors such as HQ-19 or DF-26-derived ABM systems

The newly tested Chinese radar system appears optimized for wide-area surveillance rather than terminal interception guidance alone—suggesting it plays a role akin to the U.S. PAVE PAWS or Russia’s Voronezh-DM radars in providing persistent coverage against ICBMs and hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs).

Technical Characteristics: Phased Array Architecture with High Concurrency

While official specifications remain classified, open-source assessments based on construction footprints indicate that the radar array spans several hundred meters across multiple modules—consistent with fixed-site VHF/UHF band installations capable of horizon-to-space coverage. According to Janes Defence Weekly analysts contacted by MiliVox, the system likely incorporates:

Active electronically scanned array (AESA) technology for rapid beam steering
Synthetic aperture processing for enhanced resolution at long ranges
Concurrent track-and-scan capabilities exceeding 1,000 discrete objects

This level of concurrency suggests significant advances in signal processing hardware and software integration within China’s command-and-control ecosystem—potentially linked via fiber-optic backbones or quantum-encrypted comms under PLASSF management.

Strategic Implications for Indo-Pacific Theater Deterrence

If validated at operational scale, this new radar capability would bolster China’s ability to detect massed missile strikes—including from carrier strike groups or Guam-based assets—and cue interceptors accordingly. This could complicate U.S. planning for prompt global strike (PGS) scenarios or long-range precision fires intended to degrade PLA C4ISR nodes early in conflict.

The development also aligns with China’s broader anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy aimed at creating overlapping sensor-shooter networks across maritime and land domains. Notably:

The site location offers coverage over Central Asia and parts of South Asia—suggesting dual-use monitoring roles beyond just U.S.-centric threats.
The test may have served as a demonstration for internal political signaling ahead of the CCP’s next Five-Year Plan deliberations on defense modernization priorities.

Comparative Landscape: How Does It Stack Up Globally?

Globally, only a handful of nations operate strategic missile tracking radars with comparable scale and concurrency:

United States: PAVE PAWS / SBX / LRDR systems integrated into NORAD/NORTHCOM command structures.
Russia: Voronezh-DM/VP series covering all potential ICBM ingress vectors into Russian territory.
India: Under development; DRDO working on long-range tracking radars under BMD Phase II program.

If China’s claims are accurate—and independent verification confirms sustained target-tracking at scale—it would place Beijing among this elite group with credible strategic early warning infrastructure capable of supporting both defensive intercepts and retaliatory posture calibration under nuclear doctrine thresholds.

Looming Questions About Integration and Survivability

A key question remains whether this new radar installation is hardened against kinetic or cyber-electronic attack—a critical factor given its fixed-site nature. Unlike mobile TELs or airborne ISR assets which can disperse under threat conditions, large ground-based arrays are inherently vulnerable unless deeply buried or protected by active SHORAD/IADS layers like HQ-22 batteries.

Additionally, integration into real-time kill chains involving ASAT detection or hypersonic glide vehicle discrimination will require seamless data fusion between space-, air-, sea-, and ground-based sensors—a challenge even advanced militaries struggle with due to latency bottlenecks and software interoperability issues.

A Glimpse into Future Chinese Missile Defense Ambitions

This test underscores China’s ambition not only to defend against conventional precision strikes but also potentially prepare for limited ballistic/nuclear exchange scenarios where early discrimination between decoys vs real warheads becomes paramount. As tensions rise over Taiwan Strait contingencies and regional arms races accelerate—including Japan’s acquisition of Tomahawk cruise missiles—the role of such strategic sensors will only grow more central within Beijing’s deterrence calculus.