China’s New Missile Brigades Expand First-Strike Reach to Taiwan and U.S. Bases in Pacific

China is rapidly expanding its missile forces with new brigades equipped with advanced intermediate-range and hypersonic systems. These developments significantly enhance the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force’s (PLARF) capacity for preemptive strikes against Taiwan and U.S. military installations throughout the Indo-Pacific region.

New Missile Brigades Signal Strategic Shift

In recent months, satellite imagery and open-source intelligence (OSINT) have confirmed the activation of several new PLARF missile brigades across China’s eastern and southern theaters. These units are reportedly equipped with dual-capable platforms such as the DF-26 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) and the DF-17 hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), both of which are central to China’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) doctrine.

The expansion aligns with China’s 2023 Defense White Paper emphasizing “strategic deterrence” and “informationized warfare.” Analysts from CSIS and Jane’s Defence Weekly have identified at least three new brigade-level facilities under construction or recently completed since late 2023—two in Fujian province facing Taiwan, and one in Inner Mongolia likely intended for long-range strike training or targeting U.S. bases in Guam or Japan.

DF-26 IRBM: The ‘Guam Killer’

The Dong Feng-26 (DF-26), often dubbed the “Guam Killer,” is a road-mobile IRBM with an estimated range of 4,000 km. It can carry either conventional or nuclear warheads and is capable of precision strikes on fixed targets such as airbases or ports. The missile reportedly features terminal guidance capabilities that improve its accuracy compared to earlier Chinese IRBMs like the DF-21D.

According to a 2024 Pentagon report on Chinese military power, China has deployed over 200 launchers for DF-26-class missiles—a significant increase from previous years. The system gives Beijing credible strike options against Andersen Air Force Base in Guam as well as Kadena Air Base in Okinawa—both key nodes in U.S. power projection.

Range: ~4,000 km
Warhead: Conventional or nuclear (~1 MT yield)
Basing: Road-mobile TELs

DF-17 Hypersonic Glide Vehicle Enhances Penetration Capability

The DF-17 is a short-to-medium range ballistic missile system designed to deploy a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV). With an estimated range of 1,800–2,500 km depending on payload configuration, it poses a serious challenge to existing missile defense systems due to its maneuverability during terminal flight.

The HGV component allows it to evade traditional radar tracking arcs by flying at lower altitudes than standard ballistic trajectories while executing evasive maneuvers at hypersonic speeds (>Mach 5). This makes interception by systems like THAAD or Aegis BMD significantly more difficult.

Jane’s Intelligence Review reported that at least one newly identified brigade near Xiamen has received initial operational capability (IOC) status for DF-17 deployment as of mid-2025. This location places all of Taiwan—and much of Japan—within reach.

Tactical Implications for Taiwan Contingency Planning

The forward deployment of precision-strike assets like the DF-17 near the Taiwan Strait significantly compresses response timelines for both Taipei and Washington. In a potential first-strike scenario aimed at neutralizing Taiwanese air defenses or command centers before they can react effectively, these systems offer Beijing a potent coercive tool.

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense responded by accelerating procurement of mobile counterstrike platforms such as HIMARS launchers from the United States and investing in dispersed basing strategies for its aircraft fleet. However, given China’s growing ISR capabilities—including satellite constellations like Yaogan—the survivability of fixed Taiwanese assets remains questionable under massed missile attack conditions.

A Challenge for U.S. Indo-Pacific Posture

The threat extends beyond Taiwan itself. With growing numbers of dual-capable IRBMs like the DF-26 now fielded across multiple brigades inland from coastal areas—and supported by robust C4ISR infrastructure—U.S. bases throughout Japan and Guam face heightened vulnerability during any escalation phase.

This has prompted renewed interest within INDOPACOM in hardening infrastructure through passive defenses (e.g., shelters), dispersal concepts like Agile Combat Employment (ACE), and rapid runway repair kits under programs such as Pacific Deterrence Initiative (PDI).

C4ISR Integration Enables Coordinated Strike Operations

A critical enabler behind this doctrinal shift is China’s increasingly integrated command-and-control architecture linking space-based ISR assets with ground-launched precision munitions via secure datalinks. The PLA Strategic Support Force plays a key role here by fusing ELINT/SIGINT feeds from satellites like Tianhui with real-time targeting data processed through AI-enhanced battlefield management systems.

This network-centric approach allows coordinated saturation attacks using mixed salvos—combining ballistic missiles with cruise missiles like CJ-10A—to overwhelm layered defenses such as Patriot PAC-3 or Aegis Ashore batteries deployed by regional allies including Japan and South Korea.

Electronic Warfare Support

Chinese doctrine also emphasizes electronic warfare support during initial strike phases to degrade enemy radar coverage using jamming platforms such as KJ-series AEW&C aircraft equipped with ECM pods or UAVs configured for GNSS spoofing operations—a tactic observed during recent joint exercises simulating island seizure scenarios near Dongsha Islands.

Strategic Outlook: Toward Regional Missile Parity?

The rapid proliferation of advanced Chinese missile brigades marks a shift toward regional parity—or even overmatch—in certain domains vis-à-vis U.S.-led coalitions in East Asia. While Washington retains global power projection advantages via carrier strike groups and stealth bombers like B-21 Raider entering service post–2025, China’s localized firepower advantage continues to grow within its immediate periphery.

This trend underscores an urgent need for allied investments not only in active defenses but also offensive counterstrike capabilities—including long-range fires such as Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), Tomahawk LRASM variants adapted for land attack roles, and stand-off electronic warfare platforms capable of degrading PLARF C4ISR nodes preemptively.

Nuclear Signaling Risks Increase

The dual-capable nature of many PLARF systems complicates escalation control mechanisms during crises; adversaries may be uncertain whether incoming missiles are conventional or nuclear-tipped until impact—a destabilizing factor that increases risks during high-tempo operations around flashpoints like Taiwan Strait or South China Sea islands.