Recent U.S. intelligence assessments have flagged China’s growing fleet of civilian roll-on/roll-off (Ro-Ro) ferries as a potential enabler for a future amphibious assault on Taiwan. While ostensibly commercial in nature, these vessels are increasingly designed with military utility in mind—highlighting Beijing’s civil-military fusion strategy and raising concerns about the People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) ability to rapidly surge amphibious lift capacity.
Dual-Use Ferries and the Civil-Military Fusion Doctrine
China’s civil-military fusion (CMF) strategy mandates that commercial assets be built or modified to support national defense objectives when required. This policy has led to a notable increase in dual-use infrastructure across transportation sectors—including ports, railways, and maritime vessels.
In the maritime domain, Chinese state-owned shipbuilders have been producing large Ro-Ro ferries with features tailored for military use. These include reinforced decks for heavy vehicles like main battle tanks (MBTs), modular ramps compatible with PLAN landing craft or piers lacking infrastructure, and communications suites interoperable with military command networks.
The most prominent example is the Bohai Emerald Bead-class Ro-Ro ferry series operated by COSCO Shipping Ferry Co., which can reportedly carry over 3,000 tons of vehicles and cargo—enough for an armored battalion per vessel. U.S. analysts believe at least nine such vessels are currently active or under construction with dual-use capabilities.
PLA Amphibious Lift Shortfalls and Ferry Augmentation
The PLA Navy has long faced limitations in organic amphibious lift capacity. While it operates several Type 071 Yuzhao-class LPDs and newer Type 075 LHDs capable of transporting marines and equipment across the Taiwan Strait (~180 km), these assets alone are insufficient to sustain large-scale operations against a defended coastline like Taiwan’s western shore.
To bridge this gap, China appears to be incorporating civilian Ro-Ro ferries into its strategic sealift planning. Exercises such as “Eastern Transportation Support” conducted by the Eastern Theater Command have shown civilian vessels loading armored vehicles from railway terminals and deploying them onto beaches via temporary piers or mobile causeways.
- In August 2022, PLAN conducted joint drills involving COSCO-operated ferries embarking ZTZ-96A tanks using stern ramps.
- A December 2023 exercise featured at least four Ro-Ro ships offloading mechanized infantry units onto simulated beachheads near Fujian Province.
- Satellite imagery from early 2024 shows expanded ferry berths at key ports like Xiamen and Quanzhou—both within range of Taiwan’s Kinmen islands.
U.S. Intelligence Assessments Highlight Strategic Risks
A recent report by the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), corroborated by open-source analysis from CSIS and Janes Defence Weekly, underscores how China’s merchant marine could be rapidly mobilized for wartime logistics under CMF protocols.
The ONI estimates that over two dozen large Ro-Ro ferries could be requisitioned within days to support initial invasion waves—potentially doubling or tripling PLA amphibious throughput during critical early phases of an operation against Taiwan.
This capability complicates U.S.-Taiwan defense planning by expanding the number of embarkation points and increasing ambiguity around mobilization timelines. Unlike traditional warships whose movements are tracked closely via AIS spoofing countermeasures or satellite monitoring, civilian ferries can operate under commercial cover until late in a crisis scenario.
Tactical Limitations Remain Despite Strategic Utility
Despite their logistical value, civilian ferries lack many features vital for contested amphibious operations:
- No organic air defense systems or countermeasures against anti-ship missiles;
- Lack of well decks or LCAC compatibility for over-the-horizon landings;
- Poor survivability under fire due to non-hardened hulls;
- Limited maneuverability compared to naval landing ships.
This makes them suitable primarily for follow-on echelons once beachheads are secured—or for use in less-defended areas such as outlying Taiwanese islands (e.g., Kinmen or Matsu). Nonetheless, their contribution could prove decisive in sustaining tempo during high-volume sealift operations if initial lodgments succeed.
Taiwanese Countermeasures and Regional Implications
Taiwanese defense planners have taken note of China’s dual-use ferry buildup. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) has increased surveillance on ferry traffic along China’s southeast coast using maritime radar networks and UAV patrols. Additionally:
- Taipei is investing in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities including coastal missile batteries (e.g., Hsiung Feng III), sea mines, and loitering munitions targeting embarkation points;
- The ROC Navy is enhancing its fast attack craft fleet optimized for littoral ambushes against slow-moving transports;
- Civilian ports on Taiwan’s west coast are being hardened with mobile barriers and pre-positioned demolition charges to deny use by enemy forces if seized.
Conclusion: A Gray Zone Threat With Strategic Implications
The militarization of China’s commercial ferry fleet exemplifies Beijing’s broader approach to hybrid warfare—blurring lines between civilian infrastructure and military power projection tools under its civil-military fusion doctrine. While these vessels do not replace purpose-built landing ships in high-intensity scenarios, they offer valuable surge capacity that could tip the balance during early stages of a cross-strait conflict if uncountered.
