Germany and Norway Urge Canada to Join Type 212CD Submarine Program

Germany and Norway are actively lobbying Canada to join the joint Type 212CD (Common Design) submarine program as Ottawa weighs options for replacing its aging Victoria-class fleet. The trilateral cooperation could reshape NATO’s undersea warfare capabilities in the North Atlantic and Arctic regions while offering industrial synergies across participating nations.

Canada’s Next Submarine Decision Looms

The Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) has been considering options for a next-generation submarine fleet under its Canadian Patrol Submarine Project (CPSP), aimed at replacing its four diesel-electric Victoria-class boats. These submarines—originally built for the UK Royal Navy as Upholder-class vessels in the late 1980s—were acquired second-hand by Canada in the late 1990s and have faced persistent maintenance and availability issues.

As of mid-2024, only one or two of the four boats are typically operational at any given time. With a projected out-of-service date around 2035–2040, Ottawa is under pressure to finalize a procurement path by the end of this decade to avoid a capability gap. The CPSP envisions acquiring up to 12 conventionally powered submarines with enhanced range and endurance suitable for operations in both Pacific and Arctic waters.

Type 212CD: A Proven European Platform with Arctic Credentials

The Type 212CD is an advanced evolution of ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems’ (TKMS) successful Type 212A platform operated by Germany and Italy. The CD variant—jointly developed with Norway—is optimized for extended patrol endurance, low acoustic signature, improved sensors including an optronic mast suite from Hensoldt or Safran, and increased automation reducing crew requirements.

Norway ordered four units in March 2021 under a €4.5 billion contract with TKMS; Germany is procuring two more. First steel was cut in September 2023 at TKMS’ Kiel shipyard. Deliveries are expected between 2029–2035. The design includes significant upgrades:

• Air-independent propulsion (AIP) using Siemens PEM fuel cells
• Extended hull (~73 m), displacing over 2,500 tonnes submerged
• Enhanced combat system integration via Kongsberg Defence & Aerospace
• Arctic-capable operational envelope with ice-strengthened sail

The platform’s modularity allows customization based on national requirements—an attractive feature for Canada’s dual-ocean mandate.

Strategic Alignment Among NATO Allies

At recent defense summits—including CANSEC in Ottawa (May 2024) and ILA Berlin Air Show (June)—German Defence Minister Boris Pistorius and Norwegian Defence Minister Bjørn Arild Gram jointly promoted trilateral cooperation with Canada on submarines. Their pitch emphasized interoperability benefits within NATO’s Northern Flank maritime posture.

“Canada joining would strengthen deterrence across the North Atlantic,” said Pistorius during bilateral meetings with Canadian officials. Norwegian officials highlighted shared Arctic interests and potential basing synergies between Halifax (Atlantic Fleet), Esquimalt (Pacific Fleet), Haakonsvern Naval Base near Bergen, and German Baltic ports.

The proposed model mirrors existing multinational programs such as the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter initiative or NATO’s Strategic Airlift Capability—offering economies of scale through shared logistics chains, training pipelines, spare parts pools, and joint MRO infrastructure.

Industrial Participation & Sovereignty Concerns

A key consideration for Ottawa is industrial participation by Canadian shipyards under its National Shipbuilding Strategy (NSS). While TKMS has offered technology transfer options—including final assembly or subsystem integration in Canada—no firm offset package has been made public yet.

Babcock Canada currently supports Victoria-class sustainment through its In-Service Support Contract; other domestic players like Seaspan Shipyards or Irving Shipbuilding could potentially participate depending on workshare agreements. However, critics warn that excessive reliance on foreign designs may limit sovereign control over mission systems or future upgrades—a concern echoed during Canada’s surface combatant selection process as well.

Competing Designs Still Under Review

The Type 212CD is not without competition. Other contenders reportedly include:

• Naval Group’s Scorpène Evo: A modernized version of the French export submarine featuring lithium-ion battery options.
• Saab Kockums A26: Sweden’s next-gen sub tailored for Baltic/Arctic ops; offers modular payload sections including UUV launch capability.
• Damen/Thales Walrus replacement design: Netherlands-led project focused on long-range patrols; also being considered by Poland.
• South Korea’s DSME KSS-III Batch II: Larger displacement (~3,800 tonnes), vertical launch system option; less proven but aggressive pricing possible via EDA channels.

No formal RFP has been issued yet by Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC), though industry engagement sessions have occurred since early 2023. A downselect decision is expected around late-2025 or early-2026 if funding aligns with DND capital planning cycles.

Navigating Budgetary Headwinds

The projected cost of acquiring a new submarine fleet ranges from CAD $60–100 billion over life-cycle depending on unit count, local content levels, infrastructure upgrades at bases like Esquimalt/Halifax/Nanoose Bay test ranges—and inflationary pressures already affecting NSS projects like CSC frigates or JSS support ships.

This fiscal reality may drive Ottawa toward deeper collaboration models such as co-production or leasing options—as seen in Australia’s interim plan to lease Virginia-class subs before SSN-AUKUS deliveries begin post-2040s. However unlike Australia’s nuclear ambitions under AUKUS Pillar I/II framework—which Canada has ruled out—the RCN remains committed to conventional propulsion due to political consensus against nuclear-powered vessels domestically.

A Window of Opportunity Closing Fast

If Canada wishes to align with Germany-Norway timelines—and secure early production slots—it must signal intent before detailed design freezes occur circa mid-2026. TKMS officials have stated that additional partners can still be accommodated but warned that integration costs rise significantly after hull construction begins due to configuration lock-ins tied to national specifications such as sonar fitment or weapons loadouts (e.g., DM2A4 torpedoes vs Mk48).

Conclusion: Strategic Choice Beyond Hardware

The decision facing Ottawa goes beyond selecting a submarine—it reflects broader questions about alliance integration versus sovereignty; industrial capacity versus cost efficiency; Arctic presence versus Indo-Pacific reach. Joining the Type 212CD program offers proven performance within a trusted NATO framework—but also requires timely political alignment backed by budgetary commitment if Canada hopes to avoid another prolonged procurement saga akin to past naval delays.